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What this paper adds 
 
What is already known on this topic 
 MRSA continues to cause a high burden of disease in intensive care units (ICUs). 
 Many ICUs use MRSA screening combined with isolation or decolonisation measures 
in an attempt to reduce MRSA infections, but policies vary widely between ICUs. 
 New screening technologies allow MRSA carriage to be detected more rapidly and 
with greater sensitivity, though at greater cost than conventional approachesbut are 
more expensive. 
 
What this study adds 
 The effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of different MRSA screening and control 
policies in ICUs are evaluated. 
 Interventions based on screening and decolonisation are potentially cost-saving in 
ICU settings provided carriage strains are sensitive to the agents used, with universal 
PCR-based screening likely to represent an efficient use of resources. 
 Interventions based on universal screening and isolation alone or pre-emptive 
isolation are unlikely to be cost-savingsave costs, whereas targeting screening and 
isolation to high-risk groups is likely to be a more efficient use of resourcessave costs. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Objective: To assess the cost-effectiveness of screening, isolation and decolonisation 
strategies in the control of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in intensive 
care units (ICUs).  
 
Design: Economic evaluation. 
 
Setting: England and Wales. 
 
Population: ICU patients. 
 
Main outcome measures: Infections, deaths, costs, quality adjusted life years (QALYs), 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios for alternative strategies, net monetary benefits (NMBs).  
 
Results: All strategies using isolation but not decolonisation improved health outcomes but 
increased costs. When MRSA prevalence on admission to the ICU was 5% and the 
willingness to pay per QALY gained was between £20,000 and £30,000, the best such 
strategy was to isolate only those patients at high risk of carrying MRSA (either pre-
emptively or following identification by admission and weekly MRSA screening using 
chromogenic agar). Universal admission and weekly screening using polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR)-based MRSA detection coupled with isolation was unlikely to be cost-
effective unless prevalence was high (10% colonised with MRSA on admission to the ICU). 
All decolonisation strategies improved health outcomes and reduced costs. While universal  
decolonisation (regardless of MRSA status) was the most cost-effective in the short-term, 
strategies using screening to target MRSA carriers may be preferred due to reduced risk of 
selecting for resistance. Amongst such targeted strategies, universal admission and weekly 
PCR screening coupled with decolonisation with nasal mupirocin was the most cost-effective. 
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This finding was robust to ICU size, MRSA admission prevalence, the proportion of patients 
classified as high-risk, and the precise value of willingness to pay for health benefits. 
  
Conclusions:  MRSA control strategies that use decolonisation are likely to be cost-saving in 
an ICU setting provided resistance is lacking, and combining universal PCR-based screening 
with decolonisation is likely to represent good value for money if untargeted decolonisation 
is considered unacceptable. In ICUs where decolonisation is not implemented there is 
insufficient evidence to support universal MRSA screening outside high prevalence settings. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite recent declining incidence in several European countries, methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) remains a major cause of avoidable morbidity and mortality 
in hospitalised patients, particularly in intensive care units (ICUs). MRSA infection increases 
length of stay, risk of death and treatment costs, creating a large socio-economic burden. 
Patients may also become asymptomatically colonised with MRSA. This carriage state, 
which increases their risk of developing a clinical MRSA infection and is a source for 
MRSAof cross-infection. 
 
Isolation and decolonisation are the two main targeted control measures for reducing MRSA 
transmission. Isolation interrupts MRSA cross-infection through use of physical or 
behavioural barriers such as disposable gloves and aprons (contact precautions), or placement 
of patients in dedicated isolation wards, single rooms or in cohort groups, with or without 
dedicated nursing staff. Decolonisation attempts to eliminate or suppress MRSA using topical 
antimicrobials such as chlorhexidine and intranasal mupirocin, thereby reducing the bacterial 
load available to cause endogenous infection and transmission to other patients. Isolation and 
decolonisation are often combined with patient screening to detect colonised patients. Here 
again many options exist. Firstly, there are various screening methodologies each with 
different performance characteristics: conventional culture, which is cheap but takes three or 
more days to give a result; chromogenic agars, which provide a result in one to two days; and 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests, which can give a result in a few hours and may be 
more sensitive but are more expensive. Secondly, there are questions about which patients to 
screen and when: in some settings all patients are screened on admission and at regular 
intervals thereafter, others target screening to patients considered to be at high risk of 
carriage, while some do not screen at all. Another option is to isolate high-risk patients pre-
emptively before the screening result, and only remove isolation measures in the event of 
auntil they return a negative screen.  
 
Only a few of the many possible combinations of interventions have been examined in 
clinical trials,1 2 3 4 and there is scant economic evidence available to policy makers. 
Consequently, control strategies vary from hospital to hospital. Our aim is to evaluate the 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of different combinations of screening, isolation and 
decolonisation as part of an MRSA control programme in ICUs, where consequences of 
MRSA acquisition are often greatest.  
 
 
Methods 
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A stochastic patient-level modelling approach was used to describe the stochastic nature of 
colonisation and infection, and to estimate changes to costs and health outcomes arising from 
decisions to implement different infection reduction strategies. Relevant costs and 
willingness to pay for health benefits are based on those current in England & Wales. 
 
Model 
 
A dynamic, individual-based model of MRSA transmission in an ICU was developed (Figure 
1) simulating patient movement, the transmission process and control interventions. The 
model tracks each patient’s true and perceived MRSA state (infected, colonised or 
susceptible), and allows evaluation of the impact of different infection reduction 
strategiesfrom which we estimated costs and lengths of stay. Further details are provided in 
Appendix 1.  
 
Interventions and screening scenarios 
 
Three MRSA screening technologies were evaluated: conventional culture, chromogenic agar 
and PCR. Chromogenic agar yields both 24 hour and 48 hour results. Both were considered, 
where interventions based on a 24 hour result could be amended following the 48 hour result. 
Three options for screening intensity were assessed for each technology: i) no screening 
(clinical cultures only); ii) screening all patients on admission and weekly thereafter; iii) 
admission and weekly screening for patients considered to be at high risk of carrying MRSA. 
In all strategies clinical cultures were taken with the same technology as used for screening 
(and conventional culture in the baseline strategy).  MRSA positive patients were isolated or 
decolonised according to the prevailing intervention. Isolation occurred until three negative 
swabs (taken weekly) were obtained, and decolonisation treatment consisted of a three times 
daily administration of nasal mupirocin and/or daily washing with chlorhexidine for five 
days.   
 
Each of the screening strategies was combined with either isolation or decolonisation (Table 
1) giving 12 strategies in total. In total, twelve strategies for screening plus isolation, and nine 
for screening plus decolonisation were evaluated. In both cases these included applying tThe 
interventions were applied to: i) patients identified as MRSA positive through ICU screening 
or clinical specimens; ii) all ICU admissions; or iii) high-risk admissions. Isolation was 
considered to be the application of ‘contact precautions’ rather than physical separation, so 
isolation capacity was unlimited. Decolonisation comprised was the use of either 
chlorhexidine body wash for strategies involving pre-emptive decolonisation, or nasal 
mupirocin alone, for targeting of patients identified as MRSA carriers.  
 
Each strategy was evaluated under: i) baseline parameter values (Table 2); ii) low and high 
prevalence settings (2 and 10% of patients colonised on admission); iii) small and large ICU 
sizes (5 and 20 beds); iv) with 36% rather than 18% of patients classified as high-risk.   
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Table 1. Screening and intervention combinations. In all strategies, if MRSA was recovered 
from a clinical specimen the patient was isolated or decolonised according to the specified 
intervention. “Positives” refers to any patient believed to be MRSA positive as a result of a 
clinical or screening swab. Abbreviations: Decol decolonisation; CC conventional culture; 
CA chromogenic agar; PCR  polymerase chain reaction; Mup  mupirocin; CHX  
chlorhexidine.  
 
Strategy type 
Screening Intervention Isolation 
strategy 
number 
Decol. 
strategy 
number 
Applied to Method Applied to When Isolation 
Decolonisation
(method) 
‘Do nothing’ No screening 
CC for 
clinical 
swabs only 
CC 
positives 
only 
On result 
 - 1 - 
- (CHX) - 1 
Pre-emptive 
intervention 
use 
No 
screening 
CC for 
clinical 
swabs only 
All 
patients Pre-emptively 
 - 2 - 
-  (CHX) - 2 
No 
screening 
CC for 
clinical 
swabs only 
High-risk 
patients Pre-emptively 
 - 3a - 
- (CHX) - 3 
All 
patients CC 
High-risk 
patients 
Pre-emptively 
(amended on 
screen result) 
   - 3b - 
- n/a - n/a 
Screening + 
intervention 
All 
patients on 
admission 
and 
weekly 
thereafter 
 
 
CC Positives On result 
 - 4 - 
-  (Mup) - 4 
CA 
Positives 
 On 48hr result 
 - 5a - 
-  (Mup) - 5 
Positives 
On 24hr result  
(amended on 
48hr result) 
 - 5b - 
- n/a - n/a 
PCR Positives On result 
 - 6 - 
-  (Mup) - 6 
High-risk 
patients on 
admission 
and 
weekly 
thereafter 
CC Positives On result 
 - 7 - 
-  (Mup) - 7 
CA 
 
Positives 
 On 48hr result 
 - 8a - 
-  (Mup) - 8 
Positives 
On 24hr result  
(amended on 
48hr result) 
 - 8b - 
- n/a - n/a 
PCR Positives On result 
 - 9 - 
-  (Mup) - 9 
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Table 2. Parameter values and sources.   
 
Parameter Type Parameter Mean or baseline value (SD) [values for scenario analyses] Source 
Population 
parameters 
MRSA admission prevalence  0.05 [0.02 , 0.10]  1, 5-9  
MRSA admission prevalence in high-risk group 2.4 × MRSA admission prevalence  10,11 
Proportion in high-risk group 0.18 [0.36 ] 10,11 
Number of ICU beds 10 [5, 20] ICNARC data 
Transmission 
parameters 
Daily probability of cross-colonisation per source1 0.0037 (0.00043) Analysis of individual 
data  
(see Appendix 2)  
Daily probability of cross-infection per source1 0.0006 (0.00023)
Daily probability of progression from colonisation to 
infection1 
0.047 (0.0094) 
 
Screening 
parameters 
Conventional Culture (MS-Oxacillin) 
Sensitivity (%)2 68.15 (19.39) 12-14 
 Specificity (%)2 88.23,  (6.33) 
Turn-around Time (days) 3 4 15-17
 
Chromogenic Agar 48 hour  
Sensitivity (%)2 82.55 (4.27) 18-22 
 Specificity (%)2 83.05  (17.72)
Turn-around Time (days) 3 3 15, 17, 18, 20 
 
Chromogenic Agar early result – 24  
Sensitivity (%)1 62.17 (12.49) 13, 18, 20, 21, 22 
 Specificity (%)1 97.13 (4.17) 
Turn-around Time (days)3 2 17 
 
PCR  
Sensitivity (%)2 88.40  (5.10)  16, 19, 22-29 Specificity (%)2 83.8 (4.74) 
Turn-around Time (days) 3 1 16,  17, 19,  24, 26 
Isolation 
parameters 
Percentage reduction in transmissibility of patient 
undergoing isolation precautions  36.5% (62.2%) 30 
Decolonisation 
parameters 
Percentage of treated patients who revert to an 
MRSA negative state 53% [0% and 100%] 31 [Assumptions] 
Decolonisation effect on susceptibility to colonisation (percentage reduction) 
Bodywash (chlorhexidine) 65% (7%) Analysis of individual data 
Topical therapy (mupirocin) 0% [33%] Assumption [Expert opinion] 
Decolonisation effect on susceptibility to infection (percentage reduction) 
Bodywash  (chlorhexidine) 66% (21%)  Analysis of individual data  
Topical therapy (mupirocin)  0% [10% ] Assumption [Expert opinion] 
Effect on transmissibility of an infectious patient (percentage reduction) 
Topical therapy (mupirocin)  0% [12.5%] Assumption [Expert opinion] 
Percentage reduction in probability of progression /self-infection   
Bodywash  (chlorhexidine) 69% (18%)  Analysis of individual data 
Topical therapy (mupirocin)  33% (12%) [ 47% ] 
32 
[Expert opinion] 
 
For sensitivity analysis all values expressed as percentage are assumed to follow normal distributions, truncated 
at 100%. 
1 Values represent mean (SD) probability of transmission from a single MRSA source to a single susceptible 
patient on the same ward.  
2 Values represent arithmetic means (SD) from listed sources.  
3 Turn-around times represent means of reported laboratory processing times, adjusted to account for ward 
delays as estimated in [17].  
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Model parameters were assigned pProbability distributions were used to account for 
parameter uncertainty where appropriate (Table 2). These were derived from primary peer-
reviewed research articles where possible and from new analyses of primary data otherwise 
(Table A2.1, Appendix 2). Neither approach was possible Ffor some intervention parameters 
describing the effect ofconcerning decolonisation therapy on transmission neither approach 
was possible. In these casesInstead we considered two scenarios: a conservative scenario 
which assumed no transmission blocking effect of decolonisation treatment, and a “best 
guess” scenario which made use of formal methods to elicitbased on expert opinion 
(Appendix 2).33 Full details are provided in Appendix 2.  
 
Cost-effectiveness evaluationCosts and health benefits 
 
Using the mathematical model and estimated parameter values to evaluate the likely cost-
effectiveness of defined intervention packages involved evaluating the changes in costs and 
health outcomes associated with each scenario compared with a baseline “do nothing” 
strategy, which applied interventions only to patients with MRSA-positive clinical isolates. 
 
Estimated costs included direct intervention costs, infection-related treatment costs and extra 
bed day and associated opportunity costs (Table A2.2, Appendix 2). Estimated infection 
related treatment costs of £530 were for vancomycin therapy and therapeutic monitoring for 
14 days (the standard of care in the UK for uncomplicated MRSA bacteraemia). The average 
cost of an ICU bed day of was £1,353 was based on National Health Service (NHS) reference 
costs.34  
 
Changes in hHealth benefits were due to reduced morbidity (during an ICU episode) and 
reduced mortality due to avoided infections,35 summarised by changes in Quality Adjusted 
Life Years (QALYs).36 37 QALYs accrued following hospital discharge were estimated from 
survival rates and preference-based utility scores from a recent cohort study by Cuthbertson 
et al. for the first five years after ICU discharge.38 After five years, the mortality rates were 
similar to those of the general population and age and sex matched life expectancies and 
quality adjustments were used (from the Office of National Statistics cohort expectations of 
life years and UK population norms, respectively). After discounting at 3.5% per year (as 
recommended by the national Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence39) this gave a 
discounted QALY expectancy (95% confidence intervals) on ICU discharge of 11.61 (10.74, 
12.48). We approximated this with a normal distribution with a mean (SD) of 11.61 (0.45).   
 
Additional length of stay and mortality attributable to MRSA infections were estimated using 
a time-dependent model, described in Barnett et al.40 The model was amended to give 
unadjustedgave daily discharge and death probabilities for patients with and without MRSA 
infection. The daily relative risk ratio for discharge after infection was 0.60 (95% CI: 0.53, 
0.68), and for death after infection was 1.19 (95% CI: 0.97, 1.43). 
 
The perspective for this analysis is the healthcare decision maker who manages resources at a 
regional or national level, rather than the perspective of a ward manager of a single ICU, 
medical ward or hospital. We aimed to represent the preferences of high-level policy makers 
who seek to improve the economic efficiency of health care services.  
 
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) were calculated which represent the cost per 
QALY gained on changing to an alternative intervention strategy (compared to the existing 
baseline strategy). Strategies were considered cost-effective if they generated an ICER less 
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than the usual NHS maximum willingness to pay for a unit of health outcome of £30,000 per 
QALY.41 ICERs results using the most likely parameter values (i.e. ignoring uncertainty) and 
scenario analyses are presented in Appendix 3. 
 
Results were also viewed in terms ofWe also calculated net monetary benefits (NMB) 
defined as NMB = CE   , where   is the willingness to pay per QALY gained, and 
E and C  are changes in QALYs and costs, respectively.42 Probabilistic sensitivity 
analyses were performed [as described in Spiegelhalter et al. 43], by drawing 1000 samples 
from the parameter probability distributions and averaging over 10,000 simulations for each 
sampled set of parameter values, producing for each intervention the expected NMB with 
uncertainty.  
  
 
Results 
 
Screening in combination with patient isolation 
 
Isolating clinically identified cases only (strategy 1) results in the most unisolated MRSA 
positive bed days (Figure 2). Universal pre-emptive isolation (strategy 2) minimises the 
unisolated MRSA positive days but gives the highest level of inappropriate isolation (i.e. 
isolation of patients without MRSA). Limiting pre-emptive isolation to high-risk patients 
(strategy 3a) decreases inappropriate use of isolation, but approximately halves appropriate 
isolation. Coupling pre-emptive isolation with screening and removal from isolation of those 
who screen negative (strategy 3b) increases the proportion of MRSA positive bed days in 
isolation and approximately halves the number of unisolated MRSA positive bed days. 
Amongst the different screening methodologies, PCR (strategy 6) leads to the highest 
appropriate use of isolation. The level of aAppropriate isolation usage for each methodology 
is reduced only slightly by targeting screening to high-risk patients (strategies 7–9).  
 
Strategies that isolate MRSA patients rapidly   pre-emptive isolation and isolation of PCR 
identified MRSA positive patients (strategies 2 and 6) lead to the greatest reduction in 
MRSA transmission and infection (Figure 3), although between-strategy differences in 
numbers of  MRSA infections and deaths were small (note y-axis scale in Figure 3). 
However, even small differences in mortality can will represent good value for money if the 
intervention cost is low.  
 
While aAll intervention strategies led to health gains compared to strategy 1 (“do nothing”), 
but in all cases costs also increased (Appendix 3).  When costs and health outcomes are 
combined and parameter uncertainties simultaneously accounted for, cChoosing between 
competing strategies requires consideration of cost-effectiveness acceptability curves 
(CEACs) and the cost-effectiveness acceptability frontier (CEAF). CEACs show the 
proportion of simulationsprobability of cost-effectiveness in which each strategy is cost-
effective for different values ofdependent on willingness to pay for health benefits. For the 12 
isolation strategies evaluated, tThe CEACs reveal considerable uncertainty in the optimal 
policy when the willingness to pay is within the usual NHS range of £20,000 to £30,000 
(Figure 4, panel a), with no single policy having more than a 1 in 5 chance of being 
optimalcost-effective. 
 
While CEACs are valuable for representing the degree of uncertainty in the optimal strategy 
they contain insufficient information for good decision making; identifying the strategy with 
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the highest expected NMB is more useful.44 This is illustrated on the CEAF (Figure 4, panel 
b) which shows the probability that the strategy with the highest expected NMB is cost-
effective for a given willingness to pay for health outcomes. 
 
The CEAF representing screening and isolation strategies is split into five sections (Figure 4, 
panel b). Within different ranges of willingness to pay for health benefits different strategies 
have the maximum expected NMB. For a willingness to pay of up to approximately £17,000 
per QALY the do nothing approach is favoured. Within the usual NHS willingness to pay 
range of £20,000 to £30,000 the greatest NMB is for either a strategy involving of no 
screening but simply pre-emptive isolation of high-risk patients, or a strategy using 
chromogenic agar to screen high-risk patients provides the greatest NMB. PCR screening of 
all admissions becomes the optimum strategy only once willingness to pay reaches almost 
£100,000 per QALY gained (over three times the usual NHS threshold).  
  
At baseline parameters, aA strategy of screening high-risk patients with chromogenic agar 
(and using both the early and late result) iwas optimal. Similar results were found for 
scenarios withThis was also true for smaller and larger ICUs and a higher proportion of high-
risk patients. The policy rankings are, however, sensitive to the prevalence of MRSA carriage 
on ICU admission. While fFor a low prevalence setting (2% of patients colonised with 
MRSA when admitted) strategy 8b (screening high-risk patients using chromogenic agar) 
remains cost-effective, but in a high prevalence setting (10% MRSA colonised on admission) 
screening all patients with PCR becomes cost-effective (Appendix 3). 
 
Screening in combination with decolonisation  
 
In contrast to strategies using isolation alone, all decolonisation strategies both improved 
health outcomes and reduced costs (Appendix 3). This was because decolonisation, unlike 
isolation alone, can reduce the risk of infection in MRSA carriers, which reduces additional 
bed-day costs. Pre-emptive decolonisation of all patients (regardless of MRSA status) using 
chlorhexidine (strategy 2) had a far higher probability of being cost-effective than any other 
strategy (Figure 5). At the willingness to pay threshold of £30,000 per QALY, strategy 2 
shows an approximately 70% chance of being the most cost-effective. The next best strategy 
 PCR screening of all patients combined with mupirocin treatment of MRSA positive 
patients   has an approximately 30% probability of being cost-effective. Strategy 2 also 
provides the highest expected NMB at a willingness to pay of £30,000 per QALY (Figure 5, 
panel b).  Pre-emptive decolonisation of all patients remains the most cost-effective option in 
sensitivity analyses varying ICU size, MRSA admission prevalence and the proportion of 
high-risk patients admitted (Appendix 3).  
 
Such blanket use of decolonisation agents may, however, hasten the emergence of resistance. 
For this reason, strategies employing more targeted use may be preferred. We therefore also 
present results aAssuming that strategy 2 is not a viable option. In this case then, strategy 6, 
screening all patients using PCR and decolonising (with nasal mupirocin) those identified as 
MRSA positive provides the highest expected NMB at all willingness to pay values 
over £5,000 per QALY (Figure 5, panel c). This result was not affected by ICU size, MRSA 
admission prevalence, or the size of the high-risk group (Appendix 3). Results were also 
largely insensitive to assumptions about effectiveness of decolonisation (Appendix 3). 
However, if mupirocin was assumed to be completely ineffective at clearing MRSA carriage 
(though still able to suppress endogenous infection risk during treatment) then, after 
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excluding strategy 2, strategy 6 was fractionally just over the usual cost-effectiveness 
threshold at £30,865 per QALY gained (Appendix 3). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Principal findings 
 
While the model-based analysis indicated that aA strategy of topical decolonisation for all 
patients, regardless of MRSA status, is optimal in the short-term (provided resistance to 
decolonising agents is lacking). However, such untargeted use may increase the risk of 
resistance to the decolonising agent emerging and make such strategies unsustainable in the 
long-term.45 46 For this reason, approaches that restrict the use of antimicrobial agents to 
known MRSA positive patients may be preferred. Excluding pre-emptive decolonisation of 
all patients, the optimal strategy was universal PCR-based screening for all patients (on 
admission and weekly) and decolonising those found positive. However, we acknowledge 
that there may be additional investments required to switch to a new technology, which have 
not been considered here. Figure 5 (a) shows the next best strategy was chromogenic agar 
screening of all patients (on admission and weekly) and decolonising those found positive, 
though this had a much lower probability (compared to PCR) of being the optimal strategy at 
for a 5% admission prevalence.  
 
Where decolonisation strategies are not used, admission and weekly screening coupled with 
isolation using contact precautions (gloves and gowns) is likely to reduce MRSA 
transmission, infections and deaths. More rapid detection of MRSA using PCR led to larger 
reductions in MRSA infection rates compared with screening using conventional culture or 
chromogenic agars, but these reductions were likely to be modest, despite the much faster 
PCR turn-around times. This modest effect is a consequence of the highly skewed length of 
stay distribution typically found in ICUs.40 The skewed distribution means that a because a 
small number of patients with unusually long lengths of stay account for a disproportionate 
number of MRSA-patient days.40 However, the percentage reduction in unisolated MRSA-
patient days achieved by PCR will be smallest for these long-staying patients. A simpler 
model with a constant length of stay would therefore have considerably overestimated the 
benefit of rapid versus conventional culture screening.  
 
Amongst strategies without decolonisation, universal PCR screening was highly unlikely to 
be cost-effective within the usual NHS range of £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY gained. This 
reflects both the lack of effect on the rate of progression from MRSA colonisation to 
infection, and a modest effect of contact precautions in reducing transmission, and large 
associated uncertainty which may even . This uncertainty includes the possibility that contact 
precautions increase transmission.30 This could plausibly occur as a result of poorer hand 
hygiene compliance associated with glove use.47 The optimal strategy in this case was 
sensitive to precise values used forthe MRSA admission prevalence and willingness to pay 
for health benefits. Within the usual NHS willingness to pay threshold, isolation of high-risk 
patients (pre-emptively or after identification through chromogenic agar screening) gave the 
highest NMB. However, there was uncertainty in this decision with less than a 20% chance of 
any strategy having the highest NMB. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses 
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Three strengths of the modelling approach adopted here deserve highlighting. First, tThe use 
of a dynamic transmission model accounts for the fact that preventing MRSA acquisition in 
one individual benefits both that patient and other patients through reduced risk of cross-
infection. Static decision analytic models fail to take these knock-on effects into account,48-50 
a dynamic modelling approach is required when evaluating interventions that disrupt 
transmission.51-53 Second, accurate modelling of the length of stay distribution is critical for 
assessing the benefits of rapid screening, and it is also important to accurately quantify 
additional length of stay and mortality attributable to MRSA infections. 40 These are likely to 
have been substantially over-estimated in the past by models that ignore the dynamic nature 
of infection.54 The estimates used here are much lower than those normally used and are 
closer to clinical intuition. Third, quantifying uncertainty in parameter values and accounting 
for this in the primary strategy evaluations using CEAFs represents a more rational approach 
than one based only on point estimates (or guesses) for parameter values. It leads to better 
decisions and more fully informs the decision maker about the current level of certainty. 
 
Limitations of the work relate to simplifying assumptions and generalisability. Because 
the model ignores post-discharge infections and because MRSA colonisation may have 
longer-term health consequences, as well as potentially leading to readmissions of 
colonised patients, the results presented will tend to underestimate health benefits and cost 
savings resulting from MRSA interventions.  
 
Strategies where decolonisation was targeted to those identified as positive through 
screening usedWe used a decolonisation regimen of mupirocin alone. We acknowledge 
that, whereas many protocols may involve the concurrent use of skin antiseptics at the 
same time. However, as the best available evidence on effectiveness was for mupirocin 
alone, we used these to inform our model. We would therefore expect oOur estimates of 
the effectiveness of decolonisation to are therefore likely to be conservative.  
 
In addition, pPre-emptive universal decolonisation with agents such as chlorhexidine may 
reduce other healthcare associated infections (HCAI), particularly catheter-associated 
infections, the benefit of which was not incorporated into our models.55-58 Conversely, 
decolonisation using nasal mupirocin has been reported to be associated with an increase 
of infections caused by other micro-organisms, although it remains unclear whether the 
link is causal.32 Therefore, with the possible exception of mupirocin-based decolonisation 
interventions, the cost-effectiveness estimates reported here are likely to be conservative: 
true NMBs are likely to be somewhat higher than those we report. Another assumption is 
lack of resistance to topical antimicrobial agents used for decontamination of colonised 
patients. This will not be the case for all settings:However, mupirocin resistance is not 
uncommon, and there has been a recent report of an MRSA strain with a reduced minimal 
bactericidal concentration (MBC) to chlorhexidine,45 although the relevance of this is still 
open to debate.59 In view of this, in all evaluations of decolonisation regimens we have 
performed a secondary analysis excluding universal use of decolonisation. 
   
Comparison with other studies 
 
A related Health Technology Assessment evaluated of the cost-effectiveness of MRSA 
screening in Scotland, and concluded that screening, with chromogenic agar, of all 
admissions to hospital with isolation of those identified as potential carriers proved most 
effective at reducing prevalence rates and most cost-effective, compared with no screening, 
screening according to risk (of unit) and clinical risk assessment using agar, chromogenic 
12 
 
agar and PCR.60  This was followed up with a primary study to assess the model findings.61 
These data were used to update the model and it wasA further study projected that universal 
MRSA screening could result in significant reduction in MRSA rates over a three to five 
years period in NHS Scotland, and while chromogenic agar and PCR had comparable effect, 
PCR was more costly.  
 
Our study differs in that the focus is limited to ICUs, and a wide range of intervention 
policies are evaluated fully accounting for parameter uncertainty. We combined available 
evidence to determine distributions for parameters describing intervention effectiveness. 
However, little evidence exists for the effectiveness of interventions outside of anthe ICU 
setting, indeed the HTA study assumed reduction of transmission by decolonisation was 
through clearance alone and that isolation was 100% effective. As the authors acknowledge, 
further evidence on the transmission of MRSA and effectiveness of interventions in reducing 
this transmission in non-ICU settings is required in order for the question of whole hospital 
screening to be fully evaluated.  
  
Implications and future research 
 
This research demonstrates that when accompanied with isolation (or interventions with low 
effectiveness), universal screening (with any technology) is highly unlikely to be cost-
effective, and strategies targeted to high-risk patients are favoured.  Even with conservative 
assumptions for intervention benefits, dDecolonisation strategies were found highly likely to 
be cost-effective in an ICU setting, with PCR the most cost-effective of the screening-based 
options. However we highlight the need to be vigilant for the development of resistance to 
decolonisation agents. 
 
A priority for fFuture work will be toshould extend the model to realistically describe long-
term patterns of patient movements (between and within the hospital and community) and to 
account for the spread of resistance to topical antimicrobial agents. Research is also needed 
on Understanding the longer-term consequences of widespread decolonisation, whether pre-
emptive or targeted, and to deviseing strategies to minimise the risks of emerging resistance 
should be a priority for future research. 
 
The previously identified need for clinical investigations into the effectiveness of 
interventions has again been further highlighted through this work.61,62 The large degree of 
parameter uncertainty reflects the scarcity of high quality research, and some important 
model parameters can only be estimated using single studies. Methodologically rigorous 
assessments from randomised trials of the effectiveness of interventions (isolation and 
decolonisation) in reducing MRSA transmission and infections are rare. Such studies can be 
both practical and ethical, and would be of great value in helping to make better decisions 
about intervention policies. 
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Figure 1. Model schematic showing possible patient movements (dotted arrows) and 
transitions between states (solid arrows). I, C and S represent infected, colonised and 
susceptible (MRSA negative) patients respectively.  
 
Figure 2. Use of isolation under each screening and isolation strategy showing appropriate 
isolation (isolation of MRSA positive patients), inappropriate isolation (isolation of MRSA 
negative patients) and unisolated bed days of MRSA positive patients. Grey bars indicate 
scenarios with no screening, hatched bars those strategies including pre-emptive isolation, red 
those using conventional culture screening, yellow and pink chromogenic agar screening, and 
purple PCR screening.  Bars with a black outline represent strategies where the intervention 
is carried out on the high-risk group only.  
 
Figure 3. Patient outcomes under each screening and isolation strategy, showing new 
acquisitions of MRSA by ICU patients, total MRSA infections in the ICU, and total deaths 
(all per 100 admissions). 
 
Figure 4. Panel a: Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves for screening and isolation 
strategies. Each line represents the proportion of simulations, for a particular strategy, that are 
cost-effective, as a function of willingness to pay for health benefits. Panel b: Cost-
effectiveness acceptability frontier. Lines depict the strategies with the highest expected net 
monetary benefit dependent on the willingness to pay for health benefits. Solid and dotted 
lines represent the intervention applied to all patients and only high-risk patients, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 5. Panel a: Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves for screening and decolonisation 
strategies. Each line represents the proportion of simulations for a particular strategy that are 
cost-effective, under a range values for willingness to pay for health benefits. Panels b and c:  
Cost-effectiveness acceptability frontiers. Lines depict scenarios with the highest expected 
net benefit, dependent on the willingness to pay for health benefits. Panel b compares all 
strategies; panel c excludes strategy 2. 
